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Analytically, different durées constitute distinct historical ontologies, and different levels of (partial) determination. In actual human life, they interweave, jointly constituting the zone of potential which is the present at any given moment. The sedimenting and entrenchment of privileged narratives may become defining for cultural and civilizational traditions; and such traditions themselves depend for their vitality upon the re-telling and re-enactment of these privileged narratives and rituals. Vitality may not be good news for the Others of these privileged stories-think of Serbian and Ulster Orange narratives and myths of victory and defeat-but without creative re-telling and re-enactment, an old story is just a curiosity, a dead language just a dead language, and a past culture just stuff for museums. So, perhaps, it is for individuals too. Maybe, Claúdia de Lemos and Katherine Nelson suggest, we (theorists) have frozen or de-animated the human subject, by taking it, and its language, out of time, discourse and narrative. We have constructed "chronotypes" and a "chronotypology" 2 (species of developmental time, and a typology of these species) in which the time most characteristic of language and subjectivity-the time of narrative and of the unfolding of discourse-has disappeared from view.
De Lemos and Nelson wish to challenge a particular view of development, referred to by
Nelson as the Cartesian view, in which the "I" is locked into the individual mind. The Cartesian "I" of classical developmental psychology is not only individual, it is an "I" of a highly theorized and highly theoretical kind. As so often, Piaget rendered explicit what is frequently a covert assumption, in writing of the "epistemic subject" which was the object of his theorizing. This "I" is not only individual, but depersonalized, having its existence in a chronotype of pure universal sequence. Furthermore, as de Lemos emphasizes, in the world 4 which classical developmental psychology constructs for its epistemic subject/object, everything that exists for the subject, be it the grammar of a language, or the "mind" of another person, is an object of knowledge, something "out there" to be construed in terms of a "theory" which will eventually (after going through a sequence of approximative but incorrect theories) take the shape of the correct theory, as defined by the current account (of language, of mind) espoused by the investigator as representative of the scientific community.
This view of development has eventuated in contemporary developmental psychology in a proliferation of "Theory theories," in which infants are viewed as hypothesis-testers, whose hypotheses are constrained by innate, modular knowledge of particular cognitive and epistemic domains (number, physics, language, agency, intentionality). While the individualism of the Cartesian "I" has come under much critical scrutiny by developmental psychologists in the last decade or so, the oddity of the chronotype which it postulates has received less attention. The oddity is this: having filtered out from development all aspects of temporality except that of sequence, developmental psychology then proceeds to attribute to the subject a de-historicized set of "constraints on development" which conveniently mirror the analytic presuppositions of the very sciences invoked to explain development. As Slobin (1997, p. 318 ) nicely puts it: "For more than thirty years our linguistic, psychological and philosophical disciplines have sought to replicate themselves in the mind/brain of the child.
The modules that are postulated often have names which evoke suspicion: they are the names of our own academic fields (linguistics, mathematics, physics, biology) or subfields (closedclass morphemes, grammaticizable notions). Could God or evolution have anticipated the academic and intellectual organization of late twentieth-century America?" Of course, Slobin should not be read here as advocating a renunciation of the analytic tools provided by disciplines such as linguistics, when attempting to account for how 5 children learn their native language. Rather, I think he is cautioning us against the unnoticed determinism and circularity which creeps into any story whose developmental endpoint is already pre-inscribed as a "knowledge" (tacit or not) which takes a form identical to the theories of the investigator.
It will be objected, of course, by many nativistically inclined developmentalists, that development is just such a deterministic process, whose end is inscribed in its beginning.
Where else (except in the mind of the newborn) could we look to "kick-start" development, to put the process on the right track from the beginning? At least two answers are possible (and they do not exclude each other). One is to point out, as connectionist researchers do, that the degree of necessary pre-structuring of learning mechanisms may simply have been over-estimated (Elman et al., 1996) . However, whatever the merits (and I think they are considerable) of the connectionist approach to development, it leaves intact the notion of the developing human being as an "input-output" device constrained by an end-state defined over a competence model. 3 In other words, both nativism and (most current versions of) its connectionist rival take for granted the theoretical construct referred to in the passage from Slobin cited above: the "Mind/Brain." Deconstructing this neo-Cartesian hybrid is part of the second answer to nativism.
The "Mind/Brain" is the modern, computational avatar of the Cartesian "I." It inherits the latter's universal, rationalist and individualist character, but suggests (by dint of typographic convention) that the dualism of its original has been overcome: the mind is the brain. In quite which way the mind "is" the brain is disputed by eliminativists, functionalists, and other philosophers of mind, but the identity-mapping signalled by the typography is agreed on by Thoughts, however, unlike brains, can (if the thinker so chooses) be shared (most obviously, through the medium of language). Much of our ordinary discourse about communication employs a "conduit metaphor" (Reddy, 1978) in which utterances are conduits, containers or vehicles by means of which thoughts are transferred from one individual mind to another. Given this picture of linguistic communication-which can be traced back at least to Aristotle-it is easy to envisage brains as somehow "containing" minds, in the same way that linguistic expressions "contain" thoughts. The "Mind/Brain" can then be seen as the "mental/physical" organ of thought, just as in Saussurean linguistics the linguistic sign unites the concept (content) with its physical-acoustic expression. In fact, Saussure's own psycholinguistic theory was Cartesian through and through, although this conflicted with his Durkheimian view of la langue as a social institution, and linguistic facts as social and normative facts (see Sinha, in press a, for a longer discussion). Here I can state simply one basic disagreement with de Lemos: I would maintain that, because Saussure's 7 structuralist linguistics is trapped in an irresolvable oscillation between individualpsychological, and social-collective, accounts of language and meaning, it cannot serve (or cannot serve on its own, and unmodified) the critical function which she wishes for it.
To return to the main theme. In the Cartesian view, the "sharing" of mind is secondary to its primary, individual function as private and inner representation of thought. In an alternative view, the view advanced by (amongst others, and whatever their differences) Mead, Vygotsky and Bruner, individual minds are the developmental outcome of shared mind-subjectivity is a consequence of intersubjectivity, not the other way round. Nelson argues that we should take this as a literal and strong claim. Selfhood as subjectively experienced is, phenomenologically, the conscious "core" of subjectivity, the "I" from which in the Cartesian tradition everything human (reason, judgement, ethics, grammar) stems. This Nelson's privileged vehicle for the kind of "verbal formulations" which enable young children collaboratively to co-construct their selves is narrative: "Children learn to narrativize [sic: couldn't we say narrate?] and in so doing they learn to remember their specific past and to imagine their specific future" (Nelson ms, p. 13). Narrative permits an "externalist" perspective which (a Meadian theme) constitutes the objectivized (and grammaticalized) Me of the autobiographical life story. We are what we learn to tell, and be told, together with others.
De Lemos argues, in a similar vein, that language (the language of the child and of those who address the child) should not be seen as an "object of knowledge" to be acquired by an 8 already-constituted Cartesian subject. Instead, language is a condition, a ground and a support for subjectivity, and "language acquisition is a subjectivizing process definable by changes in the child's position within a structure where … the other's parole [is] inextricably related with a corps pulsionnel, i.e. with the child as a body whose activity demands interpretation" (de Lemos ms, p. 15). Against the Cartesian "Mind/Brain" analyzing "input data" in a "hypothesis space", both de Lemos and Nelson counterpose an embodied and interested participant, in an intersubjectively constituted arena of interpretation.
There are differences between de Lemos and Nelson. While Nelson's reference to the different perspectives implied by the "I" and the "Me" is reminiscent of Mead, de Lemos suggests that "a conception of the subject-speaker as divided into two non-coincident subjective instances: the one who speaks and the one who listens to his own speech qua speech of an 'other'" (de Lemos ms, p. 19) attests to "a psychoanalytic concept of subjectivity". Where Nelson identifies narrative as the crucial speech genre in the collaborative construction of the self, de Lemos emphasizes the intra-linguistic, textual relations between different speakers' utterances in discourse, whose play of sameness/difference positions and situates the child as subject-speaker. The two texts represent voices from very different theoretical traditions: socio-culturally oriented developmental psychology, in Nelson's case; a post-structurally inflected reading of Saussure, in de Lemos' case. Despite these differences, the two authors seem to be at one, not only in their rejection of individualistic accounts of development, but also in diagnosing a fundamental problem in most current accounts of language acquisition. This is that, in the first place, the problem of how subjects are constituted is un-askable as long as one assumes its "natural" given-ness (see also Sinha, in press b); and in the second place, that in viewing language as simply a cognitive 9 puzzle for the child, the role of language/speech in enabling (perhaps even compelling) the entry of the child into the symbolic, cultural world is ignored. It is this, I take it, that de Lemos means when she says that the child is "captured" by language, a nice reversal of the usual rhetorical formulation of the child "acquiring" language.
If the reader accepts (as this one does) the diagnosis and the general direction to be taken by an alternative account, the question becomes: to what extent do these articles succeed in articulating the alternative? I think the answer is: fine, at a programmatic level, but less well at the level of analytic specificity. This is not because these articles are "too theoretical": both authors have a profound familiarity with developmental data, and with the methodological complexities of interpreting and analyzing "not yet adult" utterances. The theoretical sophistication of the two articles is based upon a solid empirical foundation. Rather, the problem lies, I would say, in the analytic tools, particularly the linguistic-theoretical tools. Until now, standard linguistic theory, both generativist and structuralist, has failed to offer the kind of conceptual apparatus capable of elucidating inherently subjective notions like perspective; of relating linguistic conceptualization to embodied perception and cognition; or of even acknowledging (let alone attempting to account for) the motivation of linguistic structure by patterns of schematized cultural meaning. This situation has, I would say, now changed, with the advent of the linguistic theory known as cognitive linguistics, whose best known representatives are George Lakoff, Ronald Langacker and Leonard Talmy (see for an overview Tomasello, in press; and, for an explicitly cultural interpretation of cognitive linguistics, Palmer 1996). I do not mean to suggest that all of cognitive linguistics-some of which is far from free from the "Mind/Brain" rhetoric of neo-Cartesianism-can or should be uncritically appropriated for the purposes that de Lemos and Nelson have in mind. What I am suggesting, however, is that 10 a serious theoretical-methodological encounter between cultural approaches to human development and cognitive linguistics needs to be put firmly on the agenda.
What benefits might such an encounter bring for Nelson and de Lemos? I can only provide the briefest of sketches. For Nelson, a linguistics which is based upon cognitive notions such as frame, schema and event structure can help to clarify how the "embodied grounding" of language is elaborated into dynamic communicative conceptualizations; and how this in turn makes possible the enculturation of self and subjectivity through metaphoric extension, conceptual blending and inter-domain mappings. For de Lemos, a linguistics which recognizes the centrality of discursively-cognitively emergent meanings, and which sees structure as the "tip of the iceberg" of processes such as perspectivization, subjectification and profiling, offers more promising theoretical tools for understanding the "capturing" of the subject through language, than does structuralism or post-structuralism, whose limited vocabulary of "system" and "positioning" is essentially static and reified.
At this point we join some of the concerns of the papers on phylogeny. Andrew Lock suggests that in complex societies, "cognition is lifted out of discourse, allowing the perception of the social structure within which it was constituted" (Lock ms, p. 19). Yet: how can cognition be "disembedded from discourse and reconstituted symbolically" (Lock ms, p. 19) except through language and discourse? And what is it that "lowers the shared level of presuppositionality amongst speakers" (Lock ms, p. 19) except language as figure-ground articulation, a dynamic mediational means for foregrounding shared meaning and reconfiguring it as background for a further level of granular specification? I would argue, again, that we need to rethink language in the way that is currently being done in cognitive linguistics, as a semiotic means which is both continuous with and transformative of the schematizing capacities which constitute non-or pre-linguistic cognition. and transform bonobo cognition, in the same way that human cultures and human natural languages "capture" human infants and set them on the "trajectory to subject-speaker" (de Lemos), is a controversial issue regarding which I have insufficient knowledge to make a judgement.
I feel more confident in saying that the reduction-axiomatic for generative linguistics-of all dimensions of human natural language complexity and creativity to syntax, has obscured rather than illuminated the issue of the uniqueness or otherwise of human language, as well as the question of language origins. Human natural languages are vastly more than combinatoric symbol systems. They are astonishingly complex systems of many-to-many mappings of conceptualization to expression, of which meaning is the fundamental motivation. Natural language (I suggest) did not emerge, Athena-like, fully armed from the brow of an alreadyexistent human "Mind/Brain." Rather, it emerged as a cognitive-communicative artefact on the basis of human socio-cultural organisation, subsequently entrenching the cognitive transformations it wrought in symbolically constituted modes of thought. Such modes of thought, and the cultural schematizations they give rise to, are indeed constitutively and 12 uniquely human. The biological substrate of human culture and the human self is probably not uniquely human, if by "unique" we understand "radically different," although clearly humans are a different species from bonobos. The real species-difference between humans and bonobos cannot, I suggest, be comprehended by reference only to brain and behaviour, whether wild or enculturated. Rather, it is more likely to be found in the evolution of our own species (in particular the niche of infancy in our species) towards the augmented exploitation of the readiness or potential of cognition and communication to "be captured" by language and social process. Figure 1 is not intended to model actual evolutionary and developmental processes, but to illustrate different ways of conceptualizing directions of causality and dependency between "levels of analysis", yielding different chronotypological models or frameworks. In the traditional view, the "biological" underlies and causes (or is identical with) the "psychological", these two levels together being referred to as the "Mind/Brain." The (uniquely) human Mind/Brain, the "organ of cognition", in turn causes the emergence of the "social" level. Because each higher level is dependent upon the lower ones, the traditional view lends itself readily to epiphenomenal and reductionist interpretations of the higher levels.
In the alternative view, the "social" (or socio-cultural) level is emergent from the biological one, relatively autonomously from (but acting back upon by "capturing") the "psychological" level (which is also non-autonomously emergent from the biological level). In this view, there 14 is no "Mind/Brain", since "mind" is co-constituted by the biological and social. Although the illustration is deliberately simplistic (to avoid the confusing device of bidirectional "interaction arrows"), it is drawn so as to emphasize the resistance of the alternative view to the kind of reductionist moves which are the inevitable accompaniment of the traditional view.
